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Abstract  
 
In theory, urban governance involves non-state actors and the state working 
together in formally institutionalized ways to make collective decisions and 
provide urban services. However, in developing country cities with highly 
informalized economies, the processes that underpin ‘real’ governance often 
reflect informal bargaining power much more than formal institutional 
frameworks. This paper uses the case of Uganda’s capital Kampala to explore 
how political configurations subvert structures of city governance, with 
particular attention to the increasing engagement between President Museveni 
and particular groups of informal workers. We present empirical research on 
market vendors and motorcycle taxi (boda–boda) drivers showing how this 
engagement benefits both the informal groups and the president. Increased 
political competition has created an environment where informal groups seeking 
to protect their livelihoods can tactically leverage a presidential intervention in 
their favour, helping them evade the policies and regulations of the City Council. 
Meanwhile, the president has used these interventions to build support in a city 
that was largely lost to the opposition. These processes have progressively 
undermined already weak formal institutions for urban governance. 
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Introduction  
 
Since the 1990s, discourses of ‘urban governance’ have displaced earlier 
preoccupations with urban planning and management, reflecting an increasing 
recognition of the role of non-state actors in running cities on a day-to-day basis. 
However, conceptions of urban governance that envisage formal 
institutionalized interaction between the local state, private sector and civil 
society actors often bear very little relation to reality. The bargaining power of 
different urban actors – including the city government itself – often depends on 
political configurations that cannot be easily accounted for in normative 
governance frameworks. This is especially the case in developing country cities 
dominated by informal economies that operate beyond formal state planning. 
Here the desire of informal economic actors to retain some distance from state 
regulation, combined with the motivations of politicians seeking urban votes, can 
produce clientelistic linkages that severely undermine efforts to govern cities 
according to transparent formal institutional processes.  
 This paper aims to contribute to understandings of how urban 
governance actually operates in highly politicized urban settings through a study 
of Kampala, Uganda. Kampala exhibits considerable informalization of processes 
of urban governance, despite the fact that it has been a key site for the 
application of new donor creeds of decentralization, privatization and new 
public management since Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986. When Gombay 
undertook a study of urban management in Kampala in the early 1990s, he 
observed that formal state structures were relatively powerless because “local 
power struggles often subvert and reshape key issues of urban management” 
(Gombay, 1994, p. 86). Since that time, this trend has been perpetuated or even 
exacerbated, but with one particular actor not mentioned by Gombay playing an 
increasingly important role in this disempowering of state institutions: President 
Museveni himself. Decentralization and other institutional reforms intended to 
promote ‘good urban governance’ have largely been superseded by clientelistic 
links between the president and particular urban groups, resulting in new forms 
of informal city governance. Many of the city’s workers increasingly secure their 
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livelihoods in the city’s crowded informal economic sphere through exploiting 
their political significance for a president facing widespread urban unpopularity, 
rather than simply through bribing local officials as observed by Gombay almost 
two decades ago.  We show how the ‘politics of survival’ in Kampala (Gombay, 
1994) has therefore transformed as decentralization and the introduction of 
multiparty elections has led to the increasing personalization of politics under 
Museveni.  
 This article is based on field research by the two authors in Kampala. 
Author 1 spent three and a half months in the city between January 2009 and 
January 2010; author 2 four months between October 2010 and March 2011. 
Between them they have therefore traced the development of this issue over a 
period of more than two years. During this time, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with a wide range of actors connected to the subject of research, 
including city government politicians and officials, national government 
representatives, motorcycle taxi drivers, market vendors, the leaders of 
associations of informal workers, journalists, and researchers. Respondents were 
selected through their expertise and through ‘snowball sampling’, in which each 
response directs the researcher to other experts or key informants. Attention 
was given to identify respondents from sufficiently diverse backgrounds.  
The article proceeds by first examining some of the changing 
development discourses around urban governance in recent decades and how 
these relate to Kampala’s development. We then turn to the Ugandan political 
system, and how its evolution since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
came to power has impacted the way politics is played out at the city level, 
particularly with regard to the informal economy. This is followed by two 
sections that examine our two case study groups – market traders and boda–
boda (motorcycle taxi) drivers – and how they have developed informal linkages 
with the president and other high-level politicians in order to secure their place 
in the urban economy, paralysing the capacities of Kampala City Council (KCC). 
The final section draws some conclusions based on the preceding analysis and its 
relevance for other contexts. 
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From planning to governance: shifting development practices and their 
impact on Kampala 
 
Cities basically fell out of favour with the international development 
community in the 1980s (Rakodi, 1997; Beall and Fox, 2009). Urban planning, 
which had been popular in the early development decades up until the 1970s, 
was largely replaced by a new discourse of ‘urban management’ in the context of 
structural adjustment and the generalized distrust of the state accompanying the 
neoliberal turn in the 1980s.  This approach envisaged a much slimmer role for 
government and the involvement of a wider range of civil society and private 
sector actors (Rakodi, 1997, Wekwete, 1997). The state was increasingly seen in 
an ‘enabling’ role with respect to city planning and government (Lee-Smith and 
Stren, 1991; Mabogunje, 1992), but beyond these basic points the concept was 
rather vague and analytically weak (Stren, 1993; Mattingly, 1994).  
 The problem with the urban management ‘cure’ in cities such as Kampala 
was that it did not address the core problem characterizing state planning: poor 
implementation. When Gombay undertook his study of Kampala’s marketplaces 
in the early 1990s, the shift towards urban management – which was sponsored 
by the World Bank through its ‘First Urban Project’ in Uganda – was starting to 
be felt. What Gombay witnessed was the early stages of a transition to an urban 
managerial approach where the state’s role had been reduced, but the proposed 
new partnerships and dynamic private sector actors were not yet stepping in to 
fill its role. He thus observed that “Urban management is going on but it is being 
done by the poor, not by the Ministry of Local Government or the Kampala City 
Council” (Gombay, 1994, p94). Part of the problem was the failure of authorities 
and donors to recognize that their conceptions of ‘improved urban management’ 
actually involved “highly contentious political issues” that were not amenable to 
technocratic, managerial solutions (Gombay, 1994, p87).  
 Since that time, the discourse of urban management has largely 
reinvented itself in the guise of ‘urban governance’, which attempts to go beyond 
technocratic managerial approaches by focusing on “decision-making about how 
resources are used in a sea of competing and different interests” (Pieterse, 2008, 
p5). In reality, however, approaches to urban governance have tended to retain 
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the depoliticizing imprint of the management discourse, neglecting questions of 
power (Beall, 1996). In Kampala, the proliferation of competing interests with a 
stake in urban governance has been exacerbated by decentralization, which 
introduced new local state actors as well various private sector ones. This 
multiplicity of actors is underpinned by power dynamics that have made both 
decision-making and policy implementation even more difficult than they were 
two decades ago.   
Among the many actors competing for influence in this amorphous sphere 
of governance are those earning a living in the urban informal economy. 
Kampala’s informal economy has grown apace, reflecting a general trend 
towards increasing informality on the African continent (Lindell, 2010). 
Notwithstanding the problems and controversies that have dogged the concept 
of the ‘informal sector’ since its inception (Bromley, 1978; Peattie, 1987; Titeca 
and De Herdt, 2010), it is hard to dispute that certain activities largely 
circumvent formal state regulation and that ‘informality matters’ for 
development (Chen, 2006; Meagher, 2010a).  Moreover, Uganda in many ways 
represents one of the leading examples of economic informalization due to the 
massive growth of the ‘Magendo’ black market under Idi Amin and Milton Obote 
(Kasfir, 1983; Prunier, 1983). This period was followed by the superimposition 
of a neoliberal and highly deregulated model of development under the NRM 
(Wiegratz, 2010), which effectively allowed informal activity to continue to 
dominate. This has had profound implications for the politics underlying ‘real 
governance’ in the city. The next section discusses changes to Uganda’s political 
system since the early 1990s, which have combined with this persistent 
economic informality to create a new ‘politics of survival’ on the streets of 
Kampala.  
 
Uganda’s changing political landscape: decentralization, multipartyism and 
the politicization of urban informality 
 
Alongside the changing national and international urban policy climate 
discussed in the previous section, Uganda has also undergone two significant 
constitutional shifts domestically since the early 1990s that have major 
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implications for Kampala’s governance. First, it transitioned from a relatively 
centralized political system to one characterized by decentralization; and second, 
Uganda has moved from a system of ‘no-party democracy’ under the aegis of the 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) to a multiparty system.  Both of these 
issues are discussed in this section.  
The institutionalization of decentralization was a fundamental change 
after decades of political centralization under former presidents Idi Amin and 
Milton Obote. Enshrined in Uganda’s 1995 Constitution and the Local 
Government Act of 1997, decentralization was a continuation of the system of 
local ‘resistance councils’ built up during the civil war (Makara, 2009) and also 
corresponded to the preferences of Uganda’s major donors (Wadala, 2007, p41). 
In Kampala – which is the only officially-designated ‘city’ in Uganda and has local 
government structures that differ from rural and other urban areas – local 
government involves the City Council and the five City Divisions that sit below it. 
The NRM’s decentralization programme is considered to be one of the most 
radical and ambitious in Africa (Hansen and Twaddle, 1998; Asiimwe and Musisi, 
2007). In Kampala 80% of services were devolved to Kampala City Council, to 
the degree that all services except national roads and secondary and tertiary 
education fall within its remit.1  
 The reintroduction of multiparty politics in 2005 brought a whole new 
political dimension to decentralization. When Museveni came to power in 1986, 
he had introduced a ten-point programme explicitly prohibiting multiparty 
politics (Museveni, 1997). Given the country’s history of ethnic conflict, he 
argued that political parties were likely to become vehicles of ethnically-based 
and exclusionary political factions and instead proposed a broad-based 
‘movement’ under the banner of the NRM; a system that came to be known as 
‘no-party democracy’ (Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango, 2000; Carbone, 2008). In 
2005, however, he gave in to ongoing pressures for a multiparty system and 
reinstituted competitive party politics (though not before amending the 
constitution to allow himself to run for president for an unlimited number of 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Raphael Magyezi, Uganda Local Government Association, 06.02.09 
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terms).2 Candidates from the opposition Democratic Party have since dominated 
KCC. This, combined with the pressures of multipartyism at the national level, 
increased the motivation for Museveni to interfere in city politics and overturn 
decisions made by KCC if this was likely to boost his support among city-dwellers 
in an increasingly open political marketplace. In other words, a situation of far-
reaching decentralization has been accompanied by central interference, 
rendering formal institutions of city government increasingly dysfunctional 
(Goodfellow, 2010). Although the city government was formally empowered by 
decentralization, it was at the same time disempowered by underfunding, the 
privatization of many of its functions and – above all – the constant intervention 
of central government. Indeed, urban governance in Kampala came to look more 
like fragmentation and ‘ungovernance’ (Meagher, 2010a) than a system of 
inclusive partnerships supported by an ‘enabling’ state.  
This central intervention in the city’s affairs effectively became formalized 
through a government bill in 2010. Since the beginning of the decentralization 
process, there has always been substantial overlap between the roles of the 
various actors at national, city and Division levels in Kampala; and conflict 
between bureaucrats and politicians (as well as between national and local 
politicians) ran very high (Makara, 2009, p252-4). In an effort to address some of 
these problems, the government tabled the Kampala Capital City Bill in 2009, 
which was passed on 2nd November 2010 with some amendments and has 
ushered in a radical restructuring of formal city governance. The major 
innovation was that it proposed disbanding KCC and creating a new Kampala 
Capital City Authority (KCCA) to govern the city on behalf of the central 
government. Overall responsibility now sits with an Executive Director 
appointed personally by the president. A position of ‘Lord Mayor’ still exists – 
elected by adult suffrage like the previous position of mayor – but with 
diminished and largely ceremonial powers, as the active day-to-day running of 
Kampala will happen through the Executive Director.3  
                                                 
2
 ‘Uganda backs multi-party return’, BBC News, 01.08.05, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4726419.stm, Accessed 01.06.11 
3
 In the remainder of this paper, we continue to refer to the city government as KCC, because most 
research was undertaken before KCCA came into being. It remains an open question as to whether 
the implementation of this bill will substantially change the situation in Kampala: some observers 
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 Related to the problem of increased central intervention, the shift to 
multipartyism has arguably exacerbated tendencies towards personalized rule 
by President Museveni that were already evident (Carbone, 2005; Mwenda, 
2007). Personalization of political rule can be described as a situation in which 
‘the connection between leader and followers is based mostly on direct, quasi-
personal contact, not on organizational intermediation’ (Weyland, 2001, p13). 
Museveni has responded to the pressures of multipartyism by frequently 
subverting state institutions created by the NRM, making highly populist, 
personalized interventions with no constitutional basis in order to enhance his 
appeal among particular groups (Mwenda, 2007; Tripp, 2010). 
In the context of Kampala specifically, where the opposition has gained 
widespread support at Museveni’s expense, this tendency is all the more evident. 
It particularly comes to the fore in the relationship between Museveni and key 
sectors in the urban informal economy. The informal economy plays an 
important role in Uganda: an ILO study found that 83.7% of urban employment 
in the 1990s was informal; significantly higher than neighbouring Tanzania 
(67%) and Kenya (58.1%) (Palmer, 2004). Moreover, the informal economy 
comprises an estimated 43.1% of Uganda’s GNP (Schneider, 2002, p6).4 
According to the Ugandan national household survey of 2009-2010, about 1.2 
million Ugandan households – 21% of the total households in Uganda – are 
engaged in informal business (UBOS, 2010). In contexts of informality, politicians 
effectively treat informal economic groups as ‘vote banks’, as these groups wield 
important political capital (Titeca, 2006, 2009). Indeed, 'in the transition to 
multiparty politics, the urban informal economy has often become a sphere of 
intense political competition' (Lindell, 2010, p3), which leads politicians to offer 
a range of favours for informal groups in exchange for votes. This is something 
Tendler (2002) terms an unspoken ‘devil’s deal’: informal actors are unofficially 
exempted from taxation and compliance with regulations in exchange for votes.   
 Whether these kinds of ‘deals’ actually empower informal groups in any 
meaningful way is the subject of some debate; it also inevitably depends on 
                                                                                                                                            
suggest that conflict between the Executive Director and Lord Mayor will be even more pronounced 
than it had been between the previous players under the old system (‘Challenges awaiting Kampala 
Authority’, The Observer (Uganda), 06.04.11).  
4
 This figure is for 1999/2000. 
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context. Meagher (2010b) and Brown and Lyons (2010) have found urban 
groups to be essentially marginalized or ‘captured’ through their informal 
interactions with elites, and it is important to recognize that “Rather than being 
merely the prime law enforcer, the state may also suspend the law and resort to 
the 'state of exception', which itself can be seen as a technique of power.”  
(Lindell, 2010, p17). Prag (2010), however, documents more successful 
examples of informal group empowerment, and it is clear that in some cases 
clientelistic ‘favours’ can actually go a long way in enabling informal actors to 
continue pursuing their livelihoods. With respect to Kampala, we document 
below how the ability of certain informal groups to stimulate personalized 
interventions by the President in their favour has been very significant for them. 
While these short-term favours and exemptions (which are often concentrated in 
the run-up to elections) are no substitute for investment in services or 
infrastructure, they do facilitate the survival of informal livelihoods in situations 
where they are being threatened by state policies and regulations.  
In the next sections, we therefore document this new ‘politics of survival’ 
among groups of urban informal workers whose power as potential voters is 
their greatest asset. This is explored through case studies of two groups that 
have particularly strong political capital in this respect: market traders and 
boda-boda (motorcycle taxi) drivers. In each case we explore how they have 
become important players in the city, with the ability to instigate a particular 
form of ‘devil’s deal’ – direct Presidential intervention – in their favour.  
 
The politics of the marketplace 
 
There is a strong consensus in Kampala that the management of 
marketplaces is one of the most enduring, intractable challenges in the city.5 
Understanding the complex political economy of petty trade in Kampala requires 
attention to some of the issues highlighted above; namely the increasing 
involvement of private sector actors in market management (Lindell and 
Appelblad, 2009) and the populist, personalized politics that has come to 
                                                 
5
Interviews with Raphael Magyezi, Uganda Local Government Association, 06.02.09; David Mpanga, 
Lawyer and Buganda Minister for Research, 13.02.09 
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dominate the city. From 2006 onwards, a programme of marketplace 
privatization was initiated by Kampala’s former mayor, in the interests of 
transforming Kampala’s dilapidated marketplaces into ‘modern’ shopping 
complexes. Many of the city’s most prominent markets were leased to private 
companies with close links to political elites, much to the annoyance of the 
market vendors who had elected the mayor on the basis that he would give them 
greater control over their own markets.6  In many cases their ability to continue 
operating in the market was threatened, and anger about these sales was 
exacerbated by the fact that the planned infrastructural improvements showed 
no sign of materializing.  
Once the scale of discontent among vendors became evident and they 
began to make appeals to the President for support, the central government 
turned on KCC, denouncing the decision to lease the markets despite the fact that 
in most cases the leases had been awarded to individuals close to the NRM itself.  
Threatened by the strength of opposition parties in the city, Museveni began to 
usurp the mayor’s former role as the ‘saviour’ of the market vendors. In contrast 
with his earlier support for privatizations he shifted to a discourse of vendor 
empowerment, leading to a surge of NRM support in the markets. In 2007, the 
president overturned KCC’s sale of Nakasero market, one of the city’s largest, and 
gave “clearance to Nakasero Market Traders and Vendors to go ahead with their 
plan to redevelop the market themselves”,7 something that many government 
sources privately suggest the vendors are not capable of doing.8 
 Fuelled by the new electoral pressures facing him after the return to 
multiparty politics, his intervention into an issue that in theory is decentralized 
to the city government9 resulted in vendor associations being re-empowered10 
and the NRM consolidating the support of an important urban group, both at the 
                                                 
6
 Interviews with Erias Lukwago, MP for Kampala Central Division, 12.10.09; Aidah Kivumbi, Acting 
District Commercial Officer, KCC, 22.09.09; Sabiti Makara, Lecturer in Political Science, Makerere 
University, 23.09.09 
7
 ‘President Meets Nakasero Market Traders’, 12.07.2007; state house website.  
8
 Interview with KCC officials, 22.09.09 and 05.10.09  
9
 Uganda’s Markets Act (Article 1) states that ‘No person or authority other than(a) the administration 
of a district;(b) a municipal council;(c) a town council, shall establish or maintain a market’.  
10
 We recognise, however, that the empowerment of certain vendors’ organisations does not mean 
the empowerment of all vendors, and concur with Lindell (2010, p11) on the importance of  
“attentiveness to power relations within associations and to the issue of whose interests such 
associations serve”. 
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City Council’s expense. Similar stories can be told for the city’s other main 
markets. Kisekka market was leased to a retired army Colonel in 2007 with ‘the 
connivance of the City Council’ and a small group of connected vendors.11 Again, 
vendors expressed their sense of betrayal by the mayor, noting that ‘he came in 
on the side of the common man but when he got involved in certain things, this 
turned around’.12  After a series of violent riots in the market in 2007-8, the 
President intervened with a directive for the market to be handed over to the 
vendors, persuading the retired Colonel to renounce his title deeds.13  
The president also intervenes to bolster his support in the marketplaces 
in other ways. For example in Nakawa market, the city’s second largest, he 
intervened not only to promote vendors’ ownership of the market but to reduce 
the daily market dues paid by vendors to the City Council.14 In the consequent 
surge of support for the NRM, the market’s own radio station – funded by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2005 for the purposes of HIV/AIDS 
sensitization – was largely used for NRM propaganda. In the Market Secretary’s 
own words during the 2011 election campaign, ‘we mainly use the radio to 
disseminate information on the NRM, and to draw support to the NRM’.15  
Moreover, during the 2011 election campaigns the market Chairperson also 
acted as Chairperson for the campaigning team for Museveni, and some profits 
from the market were used for this campaigning, with the NRM promising 
financial rewards in the future.16  
 Urban market traders have therefore increasingly found ways to exploit 
their political capital, realizing that direct or indirect appeals to State House play 
both into their own desire to subvert KCC’s policies and regulations and the 
President’s desire to draw support away from the opposition. Thus despite 
Uganda’s celebrated decentralization programme and opening of multiparty 
politics, most actors realize that still “there is too much power at the centre. (…) 
So you have to go to State House, that’s where the power lies! We have systems 
                                                 
11
 Interview, office manager, Kisekka Market, 18.01.10 
12
 Interview, office manager, Kisekka Market, 18.01.10 
13
 Mugyenyi Surrenders Kisekka Market Land Title, The New Vision, 10.07.09 
14
 Interview, Nakawa market Chairperson, 21.01.11 
15
 Interview, Nakawa market Secretary, 18.01.11 
16
 Interview, Nakawa market Chairperson and Secretary, 18.01.11 
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in place, but the real power lies with the parallel system, meaning the State 
House.”17  
Meanwhile, particular illicit activities such as illegal night markets are 
shielded from the KCC’s regulations by politicians intervening to protect vendors 
who “claim they’re their voters, looking for survival”18. In his 1994 article, 
Gombay describes in detail the growth of Owino night market in the early 1990s 
and KCC’s failure to regulate it, as well as the large amounts of money generated 
from market dues that “does not appear in the accounts” of KCC (Gombay, 1994, 
p92). Here, very little seems to have changed. Council City bureaucrats who have 
tried to implement the laws banning street trading lament that “You can’t touch 
them: if you do, politicians immediately intervene. They say: no, no, these are our 
voters!”19 Considerable amounts of revenue are still generated by such markets, 
and still do not reach formal government institutions.20 In all likelihood the main 
change since Gombay’s time is simply that it ends up in the pockets of elected 
politicians at various levels rather than bureaucrats in KCC and the Ministry of 
Local Government. This scenario is repeated countless times across the city; 
there are up to seven times as many ungazetted (illegal) markets as gazetted 
ones. These markets are hubs of the city’s ‘real’ informal economy, yet at the 
same time are tacitly ‘formalized’ through systemic non-state taxation and the 
promise of votes, both of which ensure the vendors’ survival on Kampala’s 
streets.  
 
 The rise of the boda-bodas 
 
Motorcycle taxis or boda-bodas are a very visible and numerous presence 
in Kampala: there currently are about 40,000 of them within the city and they 
constitute an important means of transport for the general population.21 Due to 
their large number, they constitute a potentially significant source of taxation: in 
2003, it was estimated that a tax on boda-bodas could raise 700 million Ugandan 
                                                 
17
 Interview with KCC official, 19.10.10 
18
 Interview with KCC Senior Commercial Officer A, 09.03.11 
19
 Interview with KCC Senior Commercial Officer B, 10.03.11 
20
 Interview with KCC Senior Commercial Officer A, 09.03.11 
21
 The overall boda-boda association has 43,700 members (40,000 motorcyclists and 3,700 bicyclists). 
(Interview data boda-boda Division and overall chairpersons.)  
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Shillings (304,347 USD) per year (Makara, 2009, p313). The first tax on them 
was introduced in the financial year 2002-2003, when KCC introduced a 
motorcycle taxi license for all boda-boda drivers. The motorcycle drivers 
complained strongly about this tax; and in the financial year 2004-2005, in the 
run-up to the 2006 elections, the issue became politicized. Representatives of the 
boda-boda drivers complained of extortion and harassment, a discourse which 
was quickly taken over by NRM politicians who branded the tax as ‘exploitation 
of the poor’ and a deliberate move by the opposition in KCC to frustrate boda-
boda drivers.  The drivers then took their protest to the President, and with great 
success: on the 2nd of June 2004, the Principal Private Secretary to President 
Museveni sent a Presidential Directive to KCC directing them to stop collecting 
the tax, claiming that it had been introduced without sufficient consultation and 
was illegal.22  
This was not the only policy measure vis-à-vis the boda-bodas which 
failed. In 2009, KCC issued a by-law stating that boda-bodas should stay outside 
the city centre; and in June 2010, a whole range of rules were introduced to 
increase their safety and that of their passengers.23 Through all of these 
measures, the City Council wanted to demarcate and regulate the number of 
boda-bodas, which have been growing explosively in the city and which cause 
high numbers of accidents. Nevertheless, all of these measures failed: as soon as 
KCC started implementing them, it encountered major problems when central 
government actors intervened. Again, the boda-boda drivers protested that these 
measures were exploitative, unreasonable and constituted harassment; they 
successfully took these issues to State House, after which pressure on KCC from 
the president or his associates made sure these policies were no longer 
implemented. Consequently, despite years of attempts by KCC, boda-bodas are 
among the only urban workers not paying any taxes at all to the City Council, and 
hardly following any formal regulations.24  
 What prevents the City Council, which is in strong need of resources and 
manages to collect some revenues even from the market vendors, from 
                                                 
22
 ‘State House stops tax on boda-boda’. The New Vision,  03.06.04.  
23
  The measure obliged the boda-bodas to have two helmets, two reflective jackets, gloves, and a 
driving permit. 
24
 Interview with Aidah Kivumbi, Acting District Commercial Officer, KCC, 22.09.09 
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implementing these basic measures? On the one hand, urban informal transport 
workers do possess a certain collective power related to their sheer number and 
the service they provide: when they go on strike, urban transport is thrown into 
chaos as much of the city population depends on them. The boda-boda industry is 
also viewed as “a good source of employment for many unemployed and 
unskilled youth”.25 Related to this, there is the fear that if forced out of the 
industry they might be drawn into other, more dangerous, activities. As 
uneducated, low-skilled men, they might easily become implicated in criminality 
or rebellion; not an unfounded concern in Uganda, with its long history of rebel 
movements.26 On the other hand, the most important reason for KCC’s inability 
to implement these measures relates to the political conflicts mentioned above. 
The central government is engaged in a struggle to maintain some degree of 
support in urban areas dominated by the opposition, and urban informal groups 
such as the boda-bodas are able to play an important role in this, as they 
constitute important political capital. As a boda-boda chairperson argues:  “For 
the politicians: we are important! We are political capital! If you need someone 
to chant, if you need advertisers, you just call us. We can market persons, we can 
teach about these persons! (…) And we are too many! We can mobilize a big 
number!”.27  
Moreover, there seems to be a consensus that this is a particularly active 
voting group.28 Whereas many other (educated) groups have lost interest in the 
voting process, this is not the case for most urban informal groups involved in 
petty trade and transport. The president has also been undertaking various other 
measures to draw the boda-bodas to his side: for example, press reports claim 
that State House officials purchased 120 boda-boda motorcycles which were 
                                                 
25
  Minister of Finance, cited in ‘Bbumba defends boda boda tax’, Daily Monitor. 24.06.10 
26
 As one boda chairperson summarizes: “Bodas, they are youth: they don’t have any other 
employment. So when they don’t have any other employment, they might go to the bush. They might 
create trouble if there’s nothing else. It’s easy to bring someone to the bush! Someone says: so you’re 
here idle, the government is not giving you any job, what are you doing here, and so on.” (Interview, 
boda boda Division chairperson, 17.10.10). 
27
 Interview Boda Division Chairperson, 17.10.2010. Another boda drivers summarizes this as 
“Politicians, they use us! We are a very big vote! I have many customers, I have a wife, I pay for my 
brother’s school fees, all these people listen to me!” (Boda boda stage chairperson interview 17-10-
10). 
28
 Interview data government officials, politicians, journalists, researchers, boda boda drivers, market 
vendors 2010-2011. 
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distributed to the drivers through micro-finance institutions.29 According to the 
Boda Division Chairperson, the actual number is even higher: they claim that 
State House has given 500 motorcycles as a soft loan through the boda-boda 
umbrella associations.30 In addition, according to some boda-boda chairpersons 
the government has formed micro-finance associations for the boda-boda drivers 
and rents an office for them. The NRM increased these interventions (in cash or 
in kind) in the run-up to the 2011 elections and even afterwards during the 
protests that shook Kampala in April-May 2011, when Museveni opened a new 
savings and credit oganization specifically for boda-bodas in order to placate 
them.31 All these interventions have taken place despite a constitutional 
framework in which the responsibility to organize (and right to tax) urban public 
transport sits clearly with the local, not national, government.32  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have shown how Uganda’s changing political and 
institutional landscape has created new opportunities for urban informal groups 
to exert their influence. The intensification of political competition has been 
accompanied by personalized presidential interventions (Tripp 2010), which 
increasingly subvert formal structures of decentralization. In this context, being 
part of a group that ‘matters’ to the president gives urban dwellers enhanced 
leverage to pursue their livelihoods unhindered by urban policies and 
regulations. Through their sheer numbers, their centrality in the urban economy 
and their youth – which links to an underlying threat of potential of violence – 
these groups have made themselves ‘matter’. In the early 1990s, ‘survival’ in 
Kampala meant coming to informal, behind-the-scenes agreements with local 
authorities, enabling both informal economic actors and local officials to secure 
extra income illicitly in the context of very low formal sector wages (Gombay, 
1994). This has changed: the new ‘politics of survival’  is rather about attracting 
the attention of State House, which has proved to be relatively easy and effective 
                                                 
29
 Sunday Monitor 13 June 2004 cited in Makara 2009: 314 
30
 Interview Boda Division Chairperson, 17.10.2010.  
31
 NTV Uganda report, 20.04.11. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-bcgnImfeo) 
32
 This is codified in the Local Government Act (1997) and Kampala Capital City Act (2010) 
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and therefore has become a central tactic in popular efforts to block the city 
government’s attempts to regulate and control urban space. The ‘politics of 
survival’ in Kampala has therefore become ‘nationalized’ in the sense that 
national-level politicians, and especially the President, regularly engage 
themselves at the local level and in ways that reinforce the acceptability rather 
than the illegality of informal economic activities. 
These developments shed light on the realities that lie behind conceptions 
of ‘urban governance’. While it is certainly true that many actors beyond the city 
authorities are involved in governing the city, these are not always the actors 
envisaged by formal governance models. Moreover, it is not only the President 
who has capitalized on his link with these urban informal groups: the groups 
themselves have manipulated it in various ways and benefitted from it, raising 
questions about power dynamics involved in actual urban governance practices. 
While in some cases informal linkages between urban economic groups and 
politicians are characterized as political co-optation and ‘capture’ (Meagher, 
2010b), here it seems that the urban groups have done much of the ‘capturing’ 
themselves, securing political capital and presidential attention for their own 
ends. In a context where the city’s broader development has long been largely 
ignored by the central government (Goodfellow, 2010), these groups have made 
themselves important players in the city, with the ability to instigate Presidential 
interventions in their favour.  
 The benefits of these interventions may be short-lived and are ultimately 
a poor substitute for gaining formal institutional recognition and support, but 
they do allow vast numbers of informal actors room for manoeuvre to continue 
pursuing livelihoods on the city streets. Whether these developments are 
beneficial for the urban population as a whole and the city’s broader 
development is another matter entirely.  This ‘politics of survival’ has led the 
government in many respects to abandon attempts to win the favour of people in 
the city through effective service delivery, which seems more remote than ever 
because most presidential interventions actively deprive the City Council of 
much-needed revenue.  As a result of these practices, formalized institutionalized 
interaction between the different layers of government, private sector and civil 
society has little impact on urban governance. The bargaining power of different 
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actors is instead constituted through the highly politicized ‘real’ urban 
governance at play, and while both the informal economic actors and the 
President benefit from these processes, they have further debilitated an already 
weak city government.  
 Engagement between informal actors and political authorities does not, 
however, need to have a negative impact on urban governance. Previous 
research has shown that “it is possible to combine support for the informal 
economy with having a vital and well-managed city” (Lund and Skinner, 2004, 
p.441). A variety of mechanisms are possible for ‘mainstreaming’ the informal 
economy, for example through the creation of specific committees at different 
levels of government and in different areas of the city (Dias and Gama Alves, 
2008; Lund and Skinner, 2004).  Crucial in these mainstreaming processes is the 
capacity of both the city government and the informal worker’s organizations, 
which can be fragile, unrepresentative and opportunistic (Lund and Skinner, 
1999), as well as lacking collective voice (Motala 2002). Overcoming these 
challenges in Kampala would require the central government to commit to 
supporting institutionalized interaction between informal organizations and the 
local authorities that engage with them on a day-to-day basis, rather than 
intervening to undermine this interaction and keep informal workers’ 
organizations in disarray. The kinds of successful partnerships evident in some 
South African and Brazilian cities (Skinner and Valodia, 2003; Dias and Gama 
Alves, 2008) require a much more serious and credible commitment to the 
autonomy of city government than is evident in Uganda. Only with such 
commitment are shared interests likely to emerge between local authorities and 
informal actors that can develop into sustained local partnerships in the 
interests of urban development, rather than the sporadic exchange of short-term 
‘favours’ based on national electoral concerns.  
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